Individuals extracting common-pool resources in the field sometimes form outputsharing groups to avoid costs of crowding. In theory, if the right number of groups forms, Nash equilibrium aggregate effort should fall to the socially optimal level.
Introduction
The common-property problem results in excessive mining, hunting, and extraction of oil and water. The same phenomenon is also responsible for excessive investment in research and excessive outlays in rent-seeking contests. As the collective work of Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom extensively documents, however, humans sometimes find creative solutions to eliminate or mitigate the ubiquitous common-property problem (Ostrom 1990 ; Ostrom and Walker 1991; Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994; Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010). One such mechanism is output-sharing (Schott, 2001; Heintzelman, Salant, Schott 2009 ). This paper investigates in a controlled laboratory setting whether agents, given an opportunity to choose the size of their output-sharing groups, can eliminate or at least attenuate the common-property problem.
Heintzelman et al. (2009) have recently analyzed the consequences of output sharing
in an environment with negative externalities and unobservable effort. They consider a game where N self-interested members of output-sharing groups simultaneously choose their fishing efforts. Every individual is assumed to pay his or her own effort cost, since effort is unobservable. The polar case where every partnership contains a single individual (N such partnerships in all) corresponds to the standard formulation of the common-property problem and is well known to result in excessive aggregate effort. As the N players are partitioned into fewer but larger partnerships, aggregate effort in the Nash equilibrium falls monotonically until the other polar extreme is reached where all N players are grouped into one grand output-sharing partnership. However, aggregate effort in that configuration is below the social optimum. Some societies seem to have hit upon this solution long ago. In Japanese fisheries, fishermen within a group of vessels share their catches. Their pooled output is sold through a common outlet, and each group member receives an equal share of his partnership's gross revenue, no matter how little effort he has expended. One hundred forty-seven Japanese fisheries engage in output sharing in spite of-or because of-the free riding involved. Platteau and Seki (2000) interviewed skippers in one such fishery, the glass-shrimp industry, to determine their motivation. The researchers were surprised to find that the fishermen never mentioned ensuring against low catches as one of the motivations for forming output-sharing partnerships. Instead, Platteau and Seki concluded that "the desire to avoid the various costs of crowding while operating in attractive fishing spots appears as the main reason stated by Japanese fishermen for adopting pooling arrangements."
These Japanese fishermen appear to have rediscovered an ancient solution to the commonproperty problem. According to anthropologists, those hunter-gatherer cultures that have survived to modern times may owe their success to their practice of sharing the fish and game caught by groups of hunters, since extensive sharing dulls hunting effort sufficiently to protect common property from over exploitation (Kagi 2001; Sahlins 1972 We build on their work by addressing several important questions that they were unable to explore in their pioneering study. We investigate whether, given the opportunity, individuals will choose to form output-sharing groups of equal size instead of everyone remaining solo.
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In addition, we investigate whether the output-sharing groups that subjects choose motivate them to invest more efficiently than they would when operating solo. To do this, we conduct a laboratory experiment where subjects vote on the size of their output-sharing groups and then play an investment game in the chosen group structure. Finally, we also explore whether individuals choose the efficient group sizes and invest optimal amounts under different costs of investment. In theory, subjects should vote to form smaller groups when investment becomes more costly. Establishing how players partition themselves endogenously is important, since in the field subjects will choose how many groups to form. If players turned out always to vote for a suboptimal number of partnerships, then our laboratory society would never solve the common-property problem even if, as in Schott et al. (2007) , it made socially optimal choices when the optimal partnership structure was exogenously mandated.
In our experiment, subjects were divided (exogenously or endogenously) into groups of equal size and played the following investment game. Each subject had to decide how to allocate his or her tokens between two projects. Project A had a return per token invested that was independent of the amount invested. Project B had a higher return per token for the first token invested, but the return decreased linearly with the aggregate investment. Hence, 2 To our knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate endogenous output-sharing groups in the setting of a common-pool resource. Whether and how individuals form groups is known to be an important issue in public goods environments ( In our experiments, individuals grouped into solo partnerships did overinvest in Project B, to their collective detriment. But as the group size increased, subjects invested smaller amounts in Project B and, as a result, obtained higher payoffs as theory predicts. When given the opportunity to choose the size of their partnerships, most of the subjects voted for the group size that maximized the joint payoff (which is socially optimal), and subjects cut the waste associated with the common-property problem on average by at least two-thirds in three of the cost treatments and by one-half in the remaining cost treatment. When we varied the opportunity cost of investing in Project B (the return from Project A), subjects tended to vote for the group size that became socially optimal given the new circumstance.
However, systematic departures from the theory were also noted. When the exogenous number of groups is predicted to yield socially optimal aggregate investment, there is no statistically significant departure from the theoretical prediction. However, when the number of groups is predicted to yield aggregate investment that is either below or above the social optimum, there are statistically significant departures from the theoretical predictions, and without exception they are in the direction of the socially optimal investment. Hence, as elsewhere in the literature, we find that laboratory behavior is more "cooperative" and "other-regarding" than a theory based on self-interested behavior would predict (i.e., Ostrom The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes our experimental design and procedures. Section 3 presents our theoretical hypotheses. Section 4 reports our experimental findings and the results of our hypothesis tests. Section 5 discusses directions for future research and concludes the paper.
Experimental Design and Procedures
We conducted 25 sessions, each with a different set of 6 participants. Most participants were undergraduates at University of Michigan. Subjects earned experimental currency (tokens), which was converted at the conclusion of the session into US dollars (1 token = 0.01 US dollars). The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . Sessions took approximately one hour and a half.
Each session was divided into six separate parts. Each of the first five parts (Parts I-V) consisted of a sequence of 5 rounds of decision making. Therefore, each subject went through 25 rounds in total. One aim of the first four parts was to give subjects experience investing as members of groups of different sizes. In Part V of the experiment, subjects chose the size of the groups endogenously. In Part VI, subjects completed a short questionnaire. At the end of the experiment, we randomly selected one round from each of the first five parts, added up the tokens each subject had earned in the selected rounds, converted that sum to dollars, added in the $5 show-up fee, and paid everyone. The average payment in the experiment was approximately $25 per subject.
In the first four parts, subjects were exogenously divided into groups of identical size:
one-member groups, two-member groups, three-member groups, or a six-member group.
Subjects were randomly rematched across groups in every round but played 5 consecutive rounds in each group size in order to gain experience. In total, there were 20 rounds in the first four parts. In order to control for order effects, the order of the first four parts was changed across sessions.
At the beginning of each decision round in the first 4 parts, participants were given 6 experimental tokens and had to decide how many of them (0, 
Final earnings in each round (in tokens) were simply the sum of earnings from Project
It can be seen that each individual pays the cost of his or her investment but shares the revenue equally with the members of his group. In each of the five rounds of Part V, subjects first voted for one of the four group sizes. Then, subjects were divided up in groups of the size that won the most votes and played the investment game.
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In our experimental design, different group sizes are socially optimal under different treatments. In particular, as the opportunity cost of investing in Project B increases, the optimal group size decreases. Subjects in a given experimental session faced only one cost parameter and had to make investment decisions in all five parts of the experiment (25 rounds). A summary of the experimental design is provided in Table 1 . As Table 1 reflects, the socially optimal group size is different for each treatment. For example, for opportunity cost c = 20, the optimal size of each group is 3 members (or, equivalently, the optimal number of groups is 2). Prior to the experiment, a test was administered to the subjects to make sure they understood the payoff consequences of their choices. The computer prevented anyone from beginning the session until everyone had a perfect score on the test.
During the experiment, subjects could either calculate their payoffs by hand or could utilize a "Situation Analyzer" provided to facilitate their calculations. A subject could enter his or her conjecture about (1) the total investment in Project B by others inside his or her group and (2) the total investment in Project B by subjects outside his or her group.
The situation analyzer would then provide a table listing in one row the seven choices for investing in Project B (0, 1, . . . , 6 tokens) and in the other row the total payoff from the two projects that the subject would earn if his or her two conjectures were accurate. Subjects were free to do such calculations by hand or to use the situation analyzer as often as they wanted before making a decision. The situation analyzer is shown in Figure 1 . 
Analyze this situation
To help subjects to make a decision, subjects were also reminded of their own investments, others' investments in their group, and the total investment, as well as their earnings from previous rounds.
After the session, we administered a short questionnaire. We asked subjects the basis .
When group size is one (no output sharing), it is easy to see that in equilibrium there is overinvestment in Project B relative to the socially optimal level. However, as the group size increases, theoretically predicted investment level decreases. In fact, for each cost parameter, it is possible to find a group size that approximately generates the socially optimal investment in Project B. The optimal group size m * , partnership solution, is the group size that (approximately) equatesx to x * . In general, we expect partnership solution to increase efficiency close to the socially optimal levels, if not to the same level.
In Table 2 , we show the predicted levels of mean investment in Project B corresponding to each group size for each level of the opportunity cost of investing in Project B. We test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. For a given opportunity cost (c) of investing in Project B, mean investment in that project strictly decreases with the size of the groups.
Hypothesis 2. Mean investment in Project B decreases with the opportunity cost of investing in that project for a given group size.
dictions were generated from a game with continuous actions, the assumption of discrete actions does not change the predictions. More specifically, suppose agents choose a non integer investment level x for Project B in the symmetric equilibrium of the continuous investment game. Then, in the discrete version, there is an equilibrium in which every player chooses the integer above x or below x, or mixes between the two. Furthermore, because the total payoff function is quadratic in investment, first-order changes in the investment in Project B induce only second-order changes in payoffs. In other words, players receive a payoff in the discrete case that is very close to that of the continuous case. Since both the actions and the payoffs of the two cases are very similar, the game played in our experiment very accurately captures the continuous-action game.
Hypothesis 3.
In Part V, subjects should vote to establish groups of the socially efficient size.
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The experimental data and findings are presented in the next section.
4 Data Analysis Figure 2 shows the average investment corresponding to each opportunity cost parameter in the first 20 rounds (Parts I-IV). For simplicity, group sizes are presented in the following order: one-member, two-member, three-member, and six-member groups, although orders were randomized during the sessions. 7 Consistent with the theoretical predictions, contributions decrease with the group size for any cost level.
Exogenous Groups and Investment Decisions
Theoretical predictions and the observed mean levels of investment in Project B are provided in Table 3 . Theory predicts that the socially optimal group size decreases with cost. Observed mean investment and predicted investment in Project B are shaded for the theoretically optimal group sizes. Observed mean investment at the optimal group size for each cost is surprisingly close to the theoretical predictions and the socially optimal level of 6 As is well-known, this voting game has multiple Nash equilibria. For example, a unanimous vote for any alternative is a Nash equilibrium since no voter is "pivotal." To avoid such problems, we piloted a second voting mechanism which has a unique Nash equilibrium: after each subject had voted for his preferred outcome, one of the six subjects was chosen to be "dictator" and his vote determined the partnership structure. Since every subject had a positive probability of being chosen dictator, each subject should have been motivated to vote for his most preferred alternative. We were unable to distinguish behavior under the two voting schemes and therefore used the more familiar, non-dictatorial scheme for this paper. 7 We do not observe any order effects in our data. We performed some nonparametric tests by using independent observations (one data point per session). One-sided sign tests confirm that there are no significant differences between the observed levels of investment and the theoretical predictions at the optimal group sizes (p-values are greater than 0.1). For non-optimal group sizes, point predictions do not hold in general (p-values are generally less than 0.05). 8 However, all deviations are toward the socially optimal level.
Result 1:
Theoretical predictions hold at the optimal group sizes. However, there are devia- tions from quantitative predictions for other group sizes. When data are not consistent with the predicted levels, deviations are in the direction of socially optimal level in all cases. Table 4 shows the observed mean payoff for each cost and group size. For cost levels c = {1, 20, 55} theoretically predicted optimal group size generates the highest level of payoff.
Note that for c = 100 theoretically predicted optimal group size is 1 (no output sharing). However, for c = 100, higher levels of payoff are achieved with group sizes more than 1. One possible explanation is that, as Table 3 shows, theoretically predicted level of investment is not very close to the socially efficient level (since it is not possible to divide individuals into non-integer group sizes). Even though the mean investment with solo groups is not significantly different than predicted, the deviations we observe in the other group sizes affect the payoffs in an unpredicted way.
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For cost levels c = {1, 20, 55}, we test whether the Partnership Solution improves the payoff of participants relative to the case where there is no output sharing (being solo). By Socially efficient payoff = 683 Standard deviations are in parentheses Number of observations = 150 per cell using matched-pair sign-rank tests, we confirm that the Partnership Solution increases the payoffs. In particular, we compare the mean payoff levels at the socially optimal group size with the mean payoff levels at the group size of one. Each individual's payoff increases with the Partnership Solution and the difference is significant at the 5% level.
For c = 100, the group size of 1 brings the lowest payoff, even though it was the theoretically optimal group size (p-values for all pairwise comparisons are 0.04). Output sharing seems to help individuals even in situations where theoretically it is not the case.
Result 2: Output sharing improves payoffs when groups are exogenously formed.
We complement nonparametric tests with a regression analysis. We investigate the impact of different group sizes, costs, the order of presenting group sizes, and rounds on individual investment decisions by running ordinary least squares estimation with robust standard errors (see Table 5 ).
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Regression results (specification 1) show that for a given cost level, an increase in the 10 Data are clustered by 20 sessions. group size decreases the level of investment in Project B. We also see that there is a negative relationship between the level of investment and the opportunity cost parameter, c. Specifications 2-4 show that these results continue to hold even when we add control variables or when we include the different treatments as dummy variables.
11 In addition, we see that the order of treatments and experience do not affect investment decisions. 12 In summary, one cannot reject hypotheses 1 and 2. Our results are robust to different estimation methods. 
Voting for Group Size:
The Plurality Rule Table 6 presents the percentage of votes that each group size received for each cost level.
There are 150 observations for a given level of cost and group size. Except for c = 100, groups frequently vote for the theoretically predicted optimal group size. Approximately 60% of the votes are socially optimal for c = {1, 55}, and approximately 40% of the votes are socially optimal for c = 20.
For each cost parameter, we test whether one can reject the null hypothesis that the proportion of votes is 25% for each group size. For c = {1, 20, 55}, one can strongly reject this null hypothesis (chi-square goodness of fit test, p-values = 0.00). For c = 100 one cannot reject that the proportion of votes are 25% for each group size (p-value = 0.10).
More important, the highest percentage of votes is for the socially optimal group sizes. In Result 4 shows that participants choose to form output-sharing groups for all cost levels.
In addition, we conduct a multinomial logit regression analysis to test whether votes are affected by cost, previous earnings and experience. 14 We construct a new variable, bestgroup, which takes value 1, 2, 3 if a subject earned the most money in Parts I-IV when the group size is 1, 2, 3, respectively, and takes value 4 if a subject earned the most money when the group size is 6. 15 Regressors are jointly significant at the 0.05 level (Wald chi-square = 74.93, p-value = 0.00). In addition, we find that both cost and bestgroup significantly affect votes (Wald tests, p-value = 0.03 and p-value = 0.00 respectively). However, coefficient estimates of round are not jointly statistically significant (p-value = 0.40). Table 7 presents the marginal effects after a multinomial logit regression. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. We see that the probability of voting for group size 6 significantly decreases with cost and increases with bestgroup, whereas the probability of voting for group size 2 decreases with bestgroup. 16 These findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions. A simple correlation analysis also confirms that votes are negatively correlated with cost (-0.21) and positively correlated with bestgroup (0.46).
Result 5:
Votes are affected by both the cost parameter and the previous earnings at different group sizes. Votes do not change significantly as subjects get more experienced with voting. Table 8 presents the voting outcomes, mean investment decisions and payoffs conditional 16 Since bestgroup is a discrete variable, we have also looked at the predicted probabilities for each group size under each possible value of bestgroup. We have observed similar results. on the chosen group size. 17 As in the exogenous groups, we see that participants choose investment levels that are consistent with the theoretical predictions at the socially optimal group sizes (all p-values are greater than 0.27). 18 Moreover, qualitative results are similar to the case when groups are exogenously imposed: investment decreases with the group size (p-value = 0.00) and cost (p-value = 0.00). Regression results are available from the authors.
Result 6: Mean investment levels in Part V are not significantly different than theoretically predicted levels at the socially optimal group sizes. In addition, investments are consistent with the (qualitative) theoretical predictions. Investment decreases with group size and cost.
Finally, we compare the efficiency of endogenous group formation with the case of exogenous groups. Efficiency of each part is defined by the observed average payoff divided by socially optimal payoff. In Table 9 , we provide the efficiency levels in all parts for each cost treatment. As expected, efficiency levels are quite large. Endogenous group formation increases efficiency compared with the case of no output sharing for all cost levels. In particular, efficiency loss decreased by 50% for cost = 100 and by 68% to 71% for the other cost levels. In this paper, we find that output sharing attenuates the common-property problem independently of the opportunity cost of investing in the common-pool resource. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find a negative relationship between the aggregate investment levels (the counterpart to fishing effort) and group size. For a given group size, we show that aggregate investment in a common-pool resource decreases as the opportunity cost of investing in it increases. More important, we show that socially optimal group sizes are the most common outcome of the endogenous group formation stage under most of the cost parameters.
Regarding the point predictions, we find that partnership solution (exogenous implementation of socially optimal group size) generates theoretically predicted levels of investment.
However, in general, theory does not predict the magnitudes very well for the non-optimal group sizes. For any deviations from equilibrium predictions, we see that investments shift toward the efficient outcome. 19 One explanation for this is that individuals are altruistic.
If individuals care not only for themselves but also for others, then one would expect to see higher levels of efficiency than a theory predicated on the assumption of self-interested behavior would predict (except when the theory predicts socially optimal outcomes). This is highly consistent with our experimental data. Moreover, this type of behavior has been commonly observed in other experimental studies on common-pool resources and public goods (see Ostrom et al. 1994; Ledyard 1995) .
Future research should address the stability of the partnership mechanism and its sensitivity to inter subject communication. By stability, we mean migrations of subjects among existing groups or from an existing group to a newly formed group. 20 The effect of inter- 
